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Boomer-ang Eldercare:
Deductible Claim?
By Wendy C. Gerzog
Combine the boomer generation with an eco-
nomic downturn and you get middle-aged children
living with their wealthy, aged parents. If children
tend to their parents’ needs, are they performing
those services gratuitously, or is there an oral agree-
ment to provide for them in the parents’ wills?
When a parent dies, is the estate entitled to a section
2053 deduction for a claim against the estate? Those
questions were some of the issues decided in Estate
of Olivo.1
The Olivos had four children who survived
them: Anthony, Matthew, Marcia, and Emila.2 An-
thony is an attorney who received an LLM in
taxation from New York University in 1979. He
practiced law in New Jersey law firms from 1976 to
1988, when he opened his own office. By the
mid-1990s, when he began to assist his parents, his
firm had started to fail.3 For the nine years preced-
ing his mother’s death on April 26, 2003,4 Anthony
lived with his parents and cared for them.5
The Olivos had serious health problems. The
father had diabetes and congestive heart failure and
died on September 21, 1995.6 The mother, the de-
cedent in the case, had diabetes, obesity, and pa-
ralysis (legs), and needed assistance with daily
living activities. She lacked mobility, the ability to
bathe and dress herself, and was incontinent. Be-
ginning in 1999 her diabetes progressed to require
insulin injections and related blood testing.7 She
developed hyperparathyroidism, hyperthyroidism,
hypertension, osteoporosis, and chronic deep vein
thrombosis, and she was hospitalized periodically
in the 10 years before her death.8
Anthony’s care of his mother was extensive, and
that workload adversely affected his health.9 He
also performed legal work for his parents. In 1995
he prepared his father’s durable power of attor-
ney10; in 1996 he did the same for his mother.11 After
his mother’s death, Anthony prepared an inventory
of the estate, filed an estate tax return in 2004, and
became the estate’s administrator.12
On the decedent’s estate tax return, Anthony
claimed the following deductions: $44,200 (admin-
istrator’s commission); $50,000 (estimated attorney
fees); $5,000 (estimated accountant’s fees); and $1.24
million (debt owed Anthony under a purported
compensation agreement with the decedent). In
2006, Anthony paid $44,200 to himself (administra-
tor’s commission), and between 2004 and 2008, he
paid himself $55,400 (attorney fees and litigation
expenses). The estate has not paid Anthony any-
thing for the alleged debt, and the probate court has
not approved any of the above payments to An-
thony and has not closed the estate.13
Because the only evidence the estate presented
was Anthony’s testimony, the Tax Court held that
the estate had not sufficiently substantiated the
deductions under section 7491(a) to shift the burden
of proof to the government for any factual issue.14
The court first addressed the deduction of the
alleged debt for services between Anthony and the
1Estate of Olivo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-163, Doc
2011-15072, 2011 TNT 133-9.
2Id. at 2.
3Id. at 3.
4Id. at 7.
5Id. at 2.
6Id. at 3.
7Id. at 4-5.
8Id. at 5.
9Id. at 2-6.
10Id. at 3.
11Id. at 4.
12Id. at 6-7. Because of a conflict with one of his sisters, it took
more than a year for Anthony to be appointed administrator. Id.
at 6.
13Id. at 7.
14Id. at 8-9.
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decedent’s estate. According to Anthony’s testi-
mony, his mother offered to pay him $200 a day for
his elder care services to her, but because he was
concerned about her having enough money, he told
her that instead of her paying him currently he
would collect from her estate. Because of that delay
and because of the complexity of computing inter-
est on that amount, she agreed to double the $200
daily amount. Anthony’s testimony was the only
evidence submitted on this issue. He claimed that
he was so distracted by daily caretaking that he
‘‘was not thinking like a lawyer during that time.’’15
Under New Jersey law, the court explained,
proving the existence of an oral promise requires
clear and convincing evidence. Even under the less
stringent preponderance of evidence standard that
usually applies in the Tax Court, the court found
Anthony’s testimony of an agreement was ‘‘highly
questionable,’’ and his assertion that he was unable
to act like a lawyer undermined by the facts,
including that he had prepared two powers of
attorney during that time.16
The Tax Court said:
Given Mr. Olivo’s training and experience as
an attorney, given how contentious the probat-
ing of his father’s estate had been, given the
apparent animosity between Mr. Olivo and
Ms. Glaes [one of Anthony’s sisters], and given
Mr. Olivo’s vested interest in ensuring that he
would receive compensation from decedent
pursuant to the alleged agreement, we find it
difficult to believe that he would not have
reduced the alleged agreement to writing or at
least have some corroborating evidence be-
yond his self-serving testimony.17
Therefore, the court held that the estate could not
deduct Anthony’s claim for services he provided
under the alleged agreement.18
Alternatively, the estate made a quantum meruit
argument for some recovery, wherein a plaintiff
who has performed services may obtain their rea-
sonable value. Quoting a New Jersey Supreme
Court case, the Tax Court outlined the four require-
ments that case law has established for a successful
claim under this theory:
(1) the performance of services in good faith,
(2) the acceptance of the services by the person
to whom they are rendered, (3) an expectation
of compensation therefor, and (4) the reason-
able value of the services.19
Under New Jersey law, when a family member
provides care for another family member in the
same household, there is a presumption that the
services constitute gifts.20 Given this presumption
and too little evidence to overcome it,21 the court
held that the estate was not entitled to deduct the
value of Anthony’s caretaking services to the de-
cedent under a quantum meruit or quasi-contract
theory.22
The court then considered the deductibility of the
administrator’s commission paid to Anthony after
the filing of the estate tax return. The applicable
regulation23 provides for the deductibility of those
expenses at the final audit of the estate tax return if
there is reasonable certainty that the claims will be
paid, the amount is within the limitations allowable
in the jurisdiction administering the estate, and the
amount represents the customarily allowed pay-
ments of ‘‘estates of similar size and character’’ in
that jurisdiction.24
The IRS argued that the commission was not
deductible because New Jersey law mandates that
commissions be approved by the probate court.
However, the Tax Court cited a statutory amend-
ment that explained approval is not required. The
court decided it would allow the deduction to the
extent provided in the statutory formula, unless the
estate does not actually pay that additional amount
to Anthony.25
Finally, the court considered the deductibility of
the estate’s payments of attorney fees actually made
to Anthony.26 A deduction for reasonable attorney
fees is allowed for amounts paid to contest the
estate’s deficiency. The IRS did not challenge a
15Id. at 10.
16Id. at 11-12.
17Id. at 12.
18Id. at 12-13.
19Id. at 13, citing Starkey, Kelly, Blaney & White v. Estate of
Nicolaysen, 796 A.2d 238, 242-243 (N.J. 2002), which cited Longo
v. Shore & Reich Ltd., 25 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1994).
20Id. at 14.
21Anthony provided care for his parents from 1994 to 1998,
which all parties accede was gratuitous. Anthony’s testimony
was the only evidence presented of an alleged compensation
agreement between the decedent and him. Several facts indi-
cated a lack of an agreement: no payments were ever made to
Anthony for his eldercare services, the probate court did not
authorize any payments, and Anthony had not instituted a
claim against the estate to recover any payments. Id. at 15.
22Id.
23Reg. section 20.2053-3(b)(1), applicable to decedents dying
before October 20, 2009.
24Estate of Olivo at 16.
25Id. at 18. The court imposed those limitations unless the
parties agree otherwise.
26Although the fees were described as $50,000 in attorney
fees and $5,000 in accountant’s fees, Anthony testified that the
actual payments were $55,400 for legal fees. Id. at 19.
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deduction for those expenses. However, it con-
tended that the $55,000 claimed on the estate’s
return was not deductible because it was not sub-
stantiated.
New Jersey law allows an attorney-administrator
to recover reasonable attorney fees for additional
legal services performed for the estate. However,
the state requires the attorney to bear the burden of
proof in substantiating those legal services and fees.
The court acknowledged that Anthony had ‘‘filed
the estate’s tax return, handled the IRS examination
on behalf of the estate, and filed the estate’s original
petition with this Court.’’27 Anthony testified that
$600 of those claimed attorney fees included $300
for a home appraisal, a $200 surrogate’s fee, and
$100 in filing fees. Anthony testified that the re-
maining amount claimed represented an estimate of
hours he worked at $150 per hour. With the lack of
specificity about the claimed services, the court
declined to allow a deduction for fees beyond the
$600 above, plus the legal fees stemming from
contesting the estate’s deficiency in the Tax Court.28
Estate of Wilson
In Wilson,29 two brothers who were distant rela-
tives of the decedent’s predeceased husband con-
secutively30 performed services for the decedent,
who was elderly and suffered from severe diabetes
and its consequences (blindness and leg amputa-
tion). The brothers provided the following services
to her: ‘‘companionship, secretarial work, chauf-
feuring, reading to her, reviewing and paying bills,
and taking her to medical and dental appoint-
ments.’’ They were employed full time elsewhere,
but worked mornings for her.31
When she died, the decedent left $100,000 to
Daniel in her will.32 On July 22, 1993, alleging an
oral contract to leave him one-third of her estate in
return for his personal and financial services, Daniel
sued her estate. After two years of litigation, the
parties agreed to mediation and the executors
agreed to pay him $550,000 plus the $100,000 spe-
cific bequest provided in the decedent’s will. The
recovery was treated as compensation, for which
the estate issued him a Form 1099.33
Approximately 14 months after the decedent’s
death, David sued the estate, alleging an oral con-
tract identical to Daniel’s.34 After two years of this
litigation, the jury found that an oral agreement did
exist. The jury valued the services at $75,000 (with-
out interest). But that finding did not limit David’s
recovery. The parties reached a structured settle-
ment in the amount of $400,000; without that agree-
ment, David’s recovery would have been
approximately $1.5 million plus $3,750, the quantum
meruit portion relating to the decedent’s real estate.
The IRS contended that the estate was entitled to
a $75,000 deduction for each payment to the broth-
ers, rather than a deduction for the full amounts
paid to them, because the jury had valued David’s
services at $75,000.35
The court disagreed and held for the estate. The
court held that the value of the agreement had to be
determined as of 1976, the date of the promise to
provide services for the duration of the decedent’s
life and for the value of one-third of decedent’s
estate at that time.36 Neither party produced evi-
dence about either of those values. Both amounts
were subject to multiple contingencies.37 Despite
these difficulties, because the brothers were not
related to the decedent and because of the brothers’
litigation and arm’s-length resolution, the court
found that their agreement was ‘‘based on adequate
and full consideration in money’s worth and not
intended as a substitute for a testamentary disposi-
tion.’’38
Analysis and Conclusion
Because it would be all too easy to convert a
taxable bequest to a family member into a deduct-
ible claim for services,39 the statute requires that a
claim be bona fide and for full and adequate
consideration in money or money’s worth.40 In
addition, to be deductible, the claim must be allow-
able under local law. In Wilson, unlike in Olivo, there
was evidence of an agreement for services (de-
cedent’s first will leaving one-third of her estate to
David), the agreement was between nonrelatives
27Id. at 20.
28Id. at 22.
29Estate of Wilson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 98-309, Doc
98-26384, 98 TNT 164-9.
30David provided services from 1976 until 1984, and his
brother Daniel provided services from 1984 until the decedent’s
death on October 3, 1992. Id. at 2-3.
31Id. at 3.
32Id. at 2. The decedent left most of her property to her
daughter.
33Id. at 6-7.
34The decedent’s 1984 will left David that portion of her
estate, but she changed her will after a disagreement with him.
Id. at 2 and 4.
35Id. at 7, n.2.
36Id. at 10.
37Unknowable were her ‘‘condition and longevity,’’ as well
as her financial needs and market fluctuations in asset values,
which could diminish the value of her estate. Id. at 11.
38Id. The court aligned both brothers’ claims despite the
differences in settlement amounts, which the court stated was
probably due to the uncertainties of litigation. Id. at 12.
39United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118 (1963). See Joseph M.
Dodge, Wendy C. Gerzog, and Bridget J. Crawford, Federal
Taxation of Gratuitous Transfers: Law and Planning 158 (2011).
40Section 2053(c)(1)(A).
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who were not the natural objects of the decedent’s
bounty, and both service providers engaged the
estate in litigation and settlement like unrelated
third parties.
In most case law on this issue involving close
relatives, the estate rarely wins because the pro-
vider of services seldom can show that there was a
compensation agreement when no money had been
exchanged between the provider and the decedent
before the decedent’s death and no income or
payroll taxes on the alleged compensation had been
paid. Moreover, many cases rest on presumptions
under state law, which, like New Jersey law in
Olivo, often presumes services provided to family
members to be gratuitous. It is clear that family
members who reside with their aged relatives per-
form arduous and needed services. Whether states
should consider an exception to those presumptions
for family members who provide eldercare, or
whether an exception would open the floodgates to
specious claims is debatable. In the meantime,
caregivers should obtain written, signed compensa-
tion agreements detailing the services to be pro-
vided for an elderly family member and the amount
of reasonable compensation that is payable either
currently or at the decedent’s death.
CORRECTION
Table 2 of Bruce Bartlett’s column, ‘‘The Fiscal Effects of
the Federal Reserve,’’ Tax Notes, Jan. 23, 2012, p. 471, had
incorrect data; the corrected table appears below.
Tax Notes regrets the error.
Table 2. Federal Reserve Deposits as a Share of
Corporate Tax Receipts
Calendar
Year
Federal
Reserve
Corpo-
rate
Taxes
Percent-
age
2010 79.3 329.6 24.1
2009 47.4 201.7 23.5
2008 31.7 233.7 13.6
2007 34.6 362.8 9.5
2006 29.1 395.0 7.4
2005 21.5 341.0 6.3
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 3.2.
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